Mitochondrial DNA Haplogroup JT is Related to Impaired Glycaemic Control and Renal Function in Type 2 Diabetic Patients

The association between mitochondrial DNA (mtDNA) haplogroup and risk of type 2 diabetes (T2D) is undetermined and controversial. This study aims to evaluate the impact of the main mtDNA haplogroups on glycaemic control and renal function in a Spanish population of 303 T2D patients and 153 healthy controls. Anthropometrical and metabolic parameters were assessed and mtDNA haplogroup was determined in each individual. Distribution of the different haplogroups was similar in diabetic and healthy populations and, as expected, T2D patients showed poorer glycaemic control and renal function than controls. T2D patients belonging to the JT haplogroup (polymorphism m.4216T>C) displayed statistically significant higher levels of fasting glucose and HbA(1c) than those of the other haplogroups, suggesting a poorer glycaemic control. Furthermore, diabetic patients with the JT haplogroup showed a worse kidney function than those with other haplogroups, evident by higher levels of serum creatinine, lower estimated glomerular filtration rate (eGFR), and slightly higher (although not statistically significant) urinary albumin-to-creatinine ratio. Our results suggest that JT haplogroup (in particular, change at position 4216 of the mtDNA) is associated with poorer glycaemic control in T2D, which can trigger the development of diabetic nephropathy

A spatial voting model where proportional rule leads to two-party equilibria

In this paper we show that in a simple spatial model where the government is chosen under strict proportional rule, if the outcome function is a linear combination of parties' positions, with coefficient equal to their shares of votes, essentially only a two-party equilibrium exists. The two parties taking a positive number of votes are the two extremist ones. Applications of this result include an extension of the well-known Alesina and Rosenthal model of divided government as well as a modified version of Besley and Coate's model of representative democracy

On the generic strategic stability of Nash equilibria if voting is costly

We prove that for generic plurality games with positive cost of voting, the number of Nash equilibria is finite. Furthermore all the equilibria are regular, hence stable sets as singletons...................................................................................................................................................................................................................

Moderating government

We consider a model where policy motivated citizens vote in two simultaneous elections, one for the President who is elected by majority rule, in a single national district, and one for the Congressmen, each of whom is elected by majority rule in a local district. The policy to be implemented depends not only on who is elected President but also on the composition of the Congress. We characterize the equilibria of the model using a conditional sincerity concept that takes into account the possibility that some voters may be simultaneously decisive in both elections. Such a concept emerges naturally in a model with trembles. A crucial feature of the solution is the moderation of Government. Our results are robust to several modifications of the model

Sincere and strategic voters in a model of proportional representation

In this paper we analyze a model of proportional representation that allows for both sincere and strategic voting. We prove that strategic voters vote only for the extreme parties in any equilibrium, if the electorate is large. Moreover, we show that there is an effect of sincere voters' behavior on the equilibrium outcome, for which strategic voters cannot fully adjust.

On Asymmetric Behaviors if Voting is Costly

Most of the voting models restrict themselves to the analysis of symmetric equilibria, i.e. equilibria in which ‘similar’ voters make ‘similar’ voting decisions. In this paper we investigate this assumption under costly plurality voting. In any pure strategy equilibrium, if two active voters have the same preference order over candidates, they do vote for the same candidate. However, as an example shows, this type of result cannot be hoped for mixed strategies equilibria.Strategic Voting, Symmetric Equilibria

Extreme Voting under Proportional Representation: The Multidimensional Case

We study the strategic behavior of voters in a model of proportional representation, in which the policy space is multidimensional. Our main finding is that in large electorate, under some assumptions on voters'preferences, voters essentially vote, in any equilibrium, only for the extreme parties.Strategic Voting, Proportional Rule, Nash Equilibrium

Electing a Parliament

We present a model where a society elects candidates belonging to two parties to a national parliament. The electoral rule determines the seats distribution between the two parties. The policy outcome is a function of the number of seats the two parties win in the election. We analyze two electoral rules, multidistrict majority and single district proportional. We prove that under both systems there is a unique pure strategy perfect equilibrium outcome. We compare the outcomes under the two systems

Voters’ preferences and electoral systems: the EuroVotePlus experiment in Italy

Motivated by the need to understand voting behaviour under different electoral rules, Laslier et al. (Eur Union Polit, 16(4):601–615, 2015) have conducted an online experiment, the EuroVotePlus experiment, focusing on the effects of the different rules adopted to elect members of the European parliament on voters’ behaviour. The experiment took place in several European countries in the 3 weeks before the 2014 elections for the European Parliament. This paper focuses on the Italian data. Firstly, we show that the behaviour of Italian respondents is consistent with the empirical findings at the European level. Then, we exploit the change from open list to closed list elections implemented in Italy in 1993 to investigate whether and how preferences over institutions are affected by experience. We find that respondents who voted using the open list system in Italy are more likely to prefer closed list systems, and that the effect is stronger the higher the number of open list elections the respondents have faced